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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
HENRY N. WILLIAMS*
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reconsidered several problems in
the field of Statutory Interpretation during the Survey period, but its
decisions largely followed principles already established in Tennessee
and other jurisdictions.
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Certain problems in the field of legislation arise in Tennessee by
reason of state constitutional provisions. The Court is committed to
the position of interpreting these provisions more or less irrespective of
the construction of comparable provisions in other state constitutions.'
The Constitution of the State of Tennessee provides: "No bill shall
become a law, which embraces more than one subject; that subject to
be expressed in the title."2 A chief justice of the Tennessee Supreme
Court who was a member of the constitutional convention of 1870
which drafted this provision has explained its purpose: "The Conven-
tion evidently designed to cut up by the roots, not only the pernicious
system of legislation, which embraced in one act incongruous and inde-
pendent subjects, but also the evil practice of giving titles to acts which
conveyed no real information as to the objects embraced in its provi-
sions."3 The title of a statute may be either narrow and restricted or
broad and general, as the legislature may determine. In either case,
if the legislation under the title is germane to-the general subject, it
is not invalid under the one-subject provision.4 If the title is general,
it justifies provisions in the body of the statute not incongruous with
its provisions as to the manner, means and instrumentality whereby it
may be enforced or its purpose accomplished.5
* Chamberlain Fellow in Legislation, School of Law, Columbia University;
formerly on Political Science faculty of Vanderbilt University.
1. "Suffice it to say that questions of State constitutional law are, in a very-
important sense, peculiarly local; and in every jurisdiction the court of last
resort must decide for itself 'the meaning of the Constitution under which it
exists, and the validity of laws enacted by the legislative branch of the govern-
ment. The decisions of other courts, construing constitutions containing. similar
provisions, can be, at most, only suggestive and advisory." Wright v. Cun-
ningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 463, 91 S.W. 293, 297 (1905).
2. TENN. CoxsT. Art. II, § 17.
3. Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 504, 518 (1872). See Note, Constitutional
Provisions Regulating the Mechanics of Enactment in Tennessee, 5 VAmN. L.
REv. 614 (1952).
4. McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of America, 254 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.
1952). "The title of an act may be as broad and general as the legislature
may prefer, and, if the legislation under it is germane to the general subject,
article 2, section 17 [of the Constitution] is not violated." Crawford v. Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. Ry., 153 Tenn. 642, 645, 284 S.W. 892, 893 (1925).
5. McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of America, 254 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.
1952); Peterson v. Grissom, 250 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn. 1952). "'The generality of a
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The Constitutional provision that
"[t]he legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the
benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit
of individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass
any law granting to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges, im-
munities or exemptions other than such as may be, by the same law ex-
tended to any member of the community who may be able to bring him-
self within the provisions of such law."6
has been a fruitful subject for judicial construction through the years.
Several years ago the Court observed:
"The determination of the validity of acts of the Legislature attempting a
classification of the counties of the State is largely influenced by the
character of the Legislation. If an act of the legislature affects particular
counties as governmental or political agencies, it is good. It is good if it
affects only one County in this capacity. No argument is required to sus-
tain such an act. If, however, an act of the Legislature primarily affects
the citizens of particular counties or of one county in their individual
relations, then such classification must rest on a reasonable basis, and if
the classification is arbitrary, the act is bad."7
The'Court was concerned during the period under review with special
laws which affected counties as governmental or political agencies
only. When a statute pertains to a county as a governmental or politi-
cal agent, the designation of the county may be on a population basis.8
Earlier cases stated the rule that the population basis is immaterial
because the county affected may just as lawfully be designated by
name.9 The more difficult question that the Court again considered is
title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation in-
congruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as
having a necessary or proper connection. The Legislature must determine for
itself, how broad and comprehensive shall be the object of a statute, and how
much particularity shall be employed in the title in defining it.' We concur
in these general views [of Judge Cooley, at page 144 of his work on Constitu-
tional Limitations] as sound and practical. . . ." Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn.
504, 519 (1872). "The general test is whether the title is uncertain, misleading
or deceptive to the average reader, and if the court feels that the title is
sufficient to direct a person of ordinary, reasonably inquiring mind to the
body of the act, compliance with the constitution has been effected." 1 SUTmER-
LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1702 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
6. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 8.
7. Darnell v. Shapard, 156 Tenn. 544, 552, 3 S.W.2d 661, 662 (1928). "It is,
of course, settled law that special legislation affecting particular counties or
municipalities in their governmental or political capacities may be enacted
without violating Article XI, Section 8 of the Constitution.... Many such acts
had been upheld by this Court. But in those cases the special act was not in
conflict with the provisions of the general law, or the classification was upon a
reasonable basis." McMinnville v. Curtis, 183 Tenn. 442, 446, 192 S.W.2d 998,
999 (1946). The question of whether parts of this quotation may require
qualification will be examined infra.
8. Peterson v. Grissom, 250 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn. 1952); Wilson v. Williams, 250
S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1952).
9. Stokes v. Dobbins, 158 Tenn. 350, 13 S.W.2d 321 (1929); State ex Tel.
Bise v. Knox County, 154 Tenn. 483, 290 S.W. 405 (1926); The Redistricting
Cases, 111 Tenn. 234, 80 S.W. 750 (1903).
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whether there are limits to the power of the legislature to control
counties with respect to governmental matters by special legislation.
The rule has been well stated: "It is a fact, I think, that a special act
affecting the county in its governmental capacity is unconstitutional
if it suspends a general law mandatorily applicable to every other
county of the State, unless there be some reasonable basis upon which
the discrimination may be rested."'1
RULES OF CONSTRUcTION
Only familiar, well-established rules of construction were enunciated
in the cases decided during the Survey period. In view of this, these
principles have simply been catalogued with no reference made to
their factual context.
The Court asserted the oft-repeated view that the cardinal rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and
give effect thereto." "The construction of statutes is an exclusive
function of the judiciary (which) ... is merely to give effect to legis-
lative intent, not to amend laws."' 2 In its efforts to determine the
legislative intent of a statute, the Court stated several rules. "If the
words of a statute plainly mean one thing they cannot be given an-
other meaning by judicial construction. ' 13 However, to effectuate
legislative intent, words may be modified, altered or supplied! 14 Legis-
lative history or other extrinsic evidence is to be ignored: "no intent
may be imputed to the legislature in the enactment of a statute other
than such as supported by the face of the statute within itself."'
5
"Statutes are to be construed as entireties16 ... giving all words used
their natural and ordinary meaning7 ... in accordance with gram-
10. Chambers v. Marcum, 255 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1953) (concurring opinion).
See Griffin v. Davidson County, 250 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1952). This rule has
been stated in many earlier cases, e.g., Donathan v. McMinn County, 187 Tenn.
220, 213 S.W.2d 173 (1948); Hamilton County v. Gerlach, 176 Tenn. 288, 140
S.W.2d 1084 (1940).
11. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 250 S.W.2d 781 (Tenn. 1952). "[TJhe application
of the law according to the spirit of the legislative body remains the principal
objective of judicial interpretation." 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 4501 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
12. State ex rel. Barksdale v. Wilson, 250 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tenn. 1952). "[I]t
is not the province of the legislature to expound the meaning of previously
existing laws. They can say what shall be the law, but are not authorized to
say what it is." Clark v. Williams, 21 Tenn. 303, 304 (1841). But, "[1]egislative
interpretation of a prior statute is entitled to respectful consideration. '..."
Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Hunt, 171 Tenn. 119, 126, 100 S.W.2d 987, 102
S.W.2d 55, 56 (1937).
13. Henry v. White, 250 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tenn. 1952).
14. Churchwell v. Callens, 252 S.W.2d 131 (Tenn. 1952).
15. Nashville v. Kizer, 250 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Tenn. 1952).
16. "It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if
possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute." 1 KENT COMm. 462
(13th ed. 1884), quoted in 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4705
(3d ed., Horack, 1943).
17. This clause states the Tennessee rule too broadly. "It is a general rule
that the words of a statute, if of common use, are to be taken in their natural
1953] 1227
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'matical rules if possible."1 8 The title of a statute may be looked to in
.aid of the construction of the body of the statute.19 The doctrine that
the unconstitutional portion of a statute will not be elided (that is,
cut out, leaving the rest of the statute in effect) unless it is evident
that the legislature would have enacted the statute had the invalid
part been omitted was reaffirmed.20 Where the statute contains no
separability clause, the presumption arises that the legislature would
not have enacted the statute except in its completed form.21
The Court had occasion briefly to examine certain presumptions with
respect to statutory interpretation. It reasserted its long-held view
that repeals.by implication are not favored and will not be presumed
,unless there is an irreconcilable conflict between the later and the
earlier laws.2 2 Statutes should not be construed so as to divest the
'State or its government of any of its prerogatives, rights or remedies
.and ordinary sense, and without any forced or subtle construction to limit or
extend their import." State v. The Clarksville & Russelville Turnpike Co., 34
Tehi. 88, 91 (1854). "[Wlhen a word used in a statute has a fixed, technical
meaning, the legislature must be understood as intending to employ it in that
sense, unless there be something in the context which indicates an intention
to use it in a different sense." State v. Smith, 24 Tenn. 394, 396 (1844).
18. Burks v. State, 254 S.W.2d 970, 972 (Tenn. 1953). Perhaps a better
statement of the Tennessee rule is: "While it is true that, in arriving at the
meaning of the legislature, primarily, the grammatical sense of the words
used is to be adopted, yet if there is any ambiguity, or if there is room for
more than one interpretation, the rules of grammar will be disregarded where
a too strict adherence to them would raise a repugnance or absurdity, or would
defeat the purpose of the legislature... . [Many] cases are but a recognition
of an old and well-established rule of the common law, applicable to all written
instruments, that ... words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and
not the intent to the words." Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 470, 497, 95 S.W.
1012, 1018 (1906). The general rule appears to be that rules of grammar are of
no great force and will be applied only when their application is consistent
with the legislative intention. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4921
(3d ed., Horack,, 1943).
19. Churchwell v. Callens, 252 S.W.2d 131 (Tenn. 1952). "Formerly the title
of an act.could not be resorted to in aid of the construction of the statute, being
regarded merely as the name or description given to it by the draughtsman.
'but [sic] since the general adoption of constitutional provisions requiring the
subject or object of every act to be expressed in the title, the title has become
-not only a necessary but an important part of a statute.' 25 R. C. L., p. 775.
This is the general rule." Southern Ry. v. Rowland, 152 Tenn. 243, 246, 276
S,W. 638 (1925). "In short, in ascertaining the intention of the legislature noth-
,ing is to be rejected which will assist in the clarification of ambiguous phases
and where the title throws light on the meaning of the statute itself, it is an
available tool for the resolution of the doubt." 2 SUTHFRLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 4802 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
20. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp. v. Dickinson, 256 S.W.2d 709
(Tenn. 1953); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. McCanless, 180 Tenn. 695, 177
S.W.2d 843 (1944). See the discussion of this point in the Miscellaneous sub-
section of the Power to Tax section of the Constitutional Law article.
21. 256 S.W.2d at 710.
22. State v. Smith, 253 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1952). "A legislative intention to
repeal is never presumed, nor are implied repeals encouraged." Smith v.
Hickman's Heirs, 3 Tenn. 330, 338 (1813). "A law is not presumed to be re-
pealed by implication; conversely, the presumption is against an implied re-
peal. The reports abound in decisions announcing the doctrine." 1 SUTHERLAND,
'STATUTORY CONSmUCTION § 2014 n.1 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
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unless the intention of the legislature to effect this object is clearly
expressed.2 3 There are exceptions to this general rule. "It is well set-
tled that 'all questions of doubt arising upon construction of taxing
statutes are to be resolved against the state.' "24 And statutes imposing
tax penalties are to be construed strictly against the state.
25
The power of the Tennessee Supreme Court to eliminate penalties
imposed by tax statutes was reamirmed. 26 The only indication afforded
by the Court as to when this power will be exercised was that it will
be employed when "the equities of the case seem to demand."27
23. State v. Smith, 253 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1952). "General words or language
of a statute that tends to injuriously encroach upon the affairs of the govern-
ment receive a strict interpretation favorable to the public, and, in the absence
of express provisions or necessary implication, the sovereign remains un-
affected." 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6301 (3d ed., Horack,
1943).
24. Evans v. Memphis Dairy Exchange, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tenn.
1952), quoting in part from Doran v. Crenshaw, 166 Tenn. 346, 348, 61 S.W.2d
469 (1933).
25. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp. v. Dickinson, 256 S.W.2d 709 (Tenn.
1953). See 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6701 (3d ed., Horack,
1943).
26. Maury County v. Porter, 257 S.W.2d 16 (Tenn. 1953) (elision not allowed
when provisions of eminent domain statute held unconstitutional); Life &
Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. McCormack, 174 Tenn. 327, 125 S.W.2d 151
(1939) (elision not allowed). The Maury County case reiterated the rule that
the doctrine of elision is not favored in Tennessee. Davidson County v. Elrod,
191 Tenn. 109, 232 S.W.2d 1 (1950) (elision allowed). See the discussion on
this point in the section on Eminent Domain in the Constitutional Law article.
27. Maury County v. Porter, 257 S.W.2d 16 (1953); Life & Casualty Ins. Co.
of Tennessee v. McCormack, 174 Tenn. 327, 125 S.W.2d 151 (1939).
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